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6.1  Overview 
Economists often argue that  exposure to foreign competition should in- 
crease plant size and productivity in less developed countries (LDCs). They 
cite several reasons. First, foreign competition reduces the market power that 
domestic producers may derive from scale economies, rationed credit mar- 
kets,  or  institutional  constraints.  Consequently,  reductions  in  protection 
should expand output among these producers and allow better exploitation of 
scale economies. Similarly, when competitive discipline is absent, the result- 
ant cushion of  monopoly profits may allow inefficiently small, wasteful do- 
mestic firms to survive. Finally, even if  profits are competed away through 
entry or the threat of entry, limited domestic demand can lead to inefficiently 
small-scale production in markets for differentiated products, where Cham- 
berlinian competition prevails. 
These positive effects of  trade exposure are widely held to apply both in 
developing and in industrialized economies. Nonetheless, analytical models 
show that they need not obtain. Whether trade liberalization improves effi- 
ciency depends critically on  the distribution of  output adjustments across 
plants with differing unit costs (Rodrik 1988a). This depends, in turn, on fac- 
tor intensities, the pattern of demand shifts, the nature of competition, and the 
extent to which  entry and exit are possible (e.g., Buffie  and Spiller 1986; 
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Brown, 1989). When technology and innovation are endogenous, further am- 
biguities result (Rodrik 1988b). 
Simulation models support the received wisdom that in LDCs, liberaliza- 
tion of imperfectly competitive industries results in larger plants and higher 
efficiency (Condon and de Melo 1986; Devarajan and Rodrik  1989a, 1989b; 
de Melo and Roland-Holst, chap. 10 in this volume). Disturbingly, however, 
there  is  very  little  micro-econometric  evidence  confirming  the  adjustment 
mechanisms that these models assume. For example, Bhagwati (1988) con- 
cludes: “Although the arguments for the success of the [outward-oriented de- 
velopment strategies] based on economies of scale and X-efficiency are plau- 
sible, empirical support for them is not available.” Pack (1989) goes further, 
claiming that the link between trade liberalization and productivity growth has 
not been established at all.’ 
Given the  lack  of  direct  evidence  regarding  industrial  adjustment in  re- 
sponse to trade liberalization, this paper tackles a very basic question. Specif- 
ically, in LDCs, how is trade orientation correlated with the size distribution 
of  plants  and  with  plant-level  labor productivity?  We  begin  with  a  simple 
model that summarizes some effects of  trade exposure on producer size and 
productive efficiency that have been stressed in the recent analytical and sim- 
ulation  literature.  We  then  examine annual plant-level  data from Chile and 
Colombia to determine whether these effects can be confirmed. 
The empirical results indicate that, over the long run, higher trade exposure 
is correlated  with  smaller  plant  sizes, controlling for industry  and country 
effects.  However,  the  mix  of  high  versus  low  productivity  plants  is  not 
strongly associated with trade exposure. Both of these findings cast doubt on 
the  mechanisms  linking  trade,  plant  size, and  productivity  in  a number of 
recent analytical and simulation studies. 
6.2  Theories Linking ’hade Regime and Size Rationalization 
6.2.1  The Analytics of Size Rationalization under Imperfect Competition 
To  motivate our empirical work, we begin  with an expository model that 
generates several predictions familiar from the trade and development litera- 
ture.2 First,  assume that within each industry, domestically produced goods 
1. Pack (1989) writes: “Comparisons of total factor productivity growth among countries pur- 
suing different international trade orientations do not reveal systematic differences in productivity 
growth in manufacturing, nor do the time-series studies of individual countries that have experi- 
enced alternating trade regimes allow strong conclusions in this dimension.  . . . Moreover, the 
firm-level data collected for estimation of production frontiers are quite reliable and confirm the 
pattern established at more aggregated levels.” 
2. Buffie and Spiller (1986), Dixit and Norman (1980), Dutz (1990), Lancaster (1984). Help- 
man and Krugman (1985), Horstmann and Markusen (l986),  and Markusen (1981) are among the 
many relevant references in the analytical literature. Simulation results that reflect at least some of 
the effects described here include those found in Harris (1984). Rodrik (1988a), Devarajan and 171  Size Rationalization and Trade Exposure 
are perfect substitutes, and domestic firms are Cournot quantity competitors 
vis-2-vis one another. Also, let the domestic product be an imperfect substi- 
tute for imports, so that the demand curve faced by domestic producers may 
be written as P  = P(Q,n),  where Q = Zq,,  q,  is the output of the irh  producer, 
and R is the set of factors that determine exposure to world rnarket~.~  This set 
includes quantitative restrains (QRs), tariffs, and the real exchange rate. Fi- 
nally, define C,  = F  + q,c,  to be the total costs of  producing q, borne by the 
irh  plant  (i = 1, n),  where F and c,  are constants. The presence of  marginal 
cost heterogeneity is meant to reflect differences in managerial abilities, credit 
market access, and capital sto~ks.~ 
As is well known, the first-order condition for profit maximization  under 
Cournot competition is 
so firms with low marginal costs are relatively  large.5  Also,  summing equa- 
tion (1) over all plants,  equilibrium output and price in this market depend 
only on the sum of marginal costs and not on the distribution of marginal costs 
across plants (e.g., Bergstrom and Varian 1985): 
n 
nP (QJU + QPJQAN  = 2  c,. 
,=I  (2) 
Given n, and assuming P, < 0,  there is thus a negative monotonic relation- 
ship between Zc, and the equilibrium  industry output,  Q. In  turn, given Q, 
each plant’s output q,  is determined recursively by equation (1). 
If market entry and exit are free, the number of firms is endogenous. To 
characterize equilibrium in this case, we require that the last and least efficient 
plant (plant n)  covers costs, and that all potential firms not in the market antic- 
ipate losses upon entry. Sorting plants in order of increasing average cost, this 
condition amounts to 
(3) 
Rodrik (1989a. 1989b). Condon and de Melo (1990), de Melo and Roland-Holst (chap. 10, in this 
volume), and Tan and de Melo (forthcoming).  If there is a novelty to our model, it is that we 
simultaneously treat cost heterogeneity and entryiexit effects. 
3. Domestic markets are small relative to the rest of the world, and foreign producers do not 
react strategically to domestic producers’ behavior. 
4. Most models in the trade literature do not allow for marginal cost heterogeneity; we include 
it here for two reasons.  First,  it captures the spirit of  the X-efficiency arguments found in the 
development literature. Second, it is an important feature of  theoretical models that explain the 
persistent size heterogeneity one finds in  virtually all plant-level census data (e.g.,  Jovanovic 
1982). 
5. We  do not believe the link between size and efficiency is well established in the empirical 
literature on developing countries. However, as this link is assumed in most analytical and simu- 
lation models, we assume it holds here to demonstrate how these models work. 172  Mark J. Roberts and James R. ”bout 
where q,+,  is the output level the n + lth (potential) plant would choose if it 
were to enter the market. 
6.2.2  Demand Shifts and Rationalization 
We  can now review predictions about the link between demand shifts and 
the  size distribution of plants.  Hereafter,  any shift that results  in plant  size 
adjustments that reduce the industry-wide average cost will be said to have 
“rationalized” industry. In our framework this can occur two ways-either  by 
increasing output levels overall and reducing average fixed costs, or by shift- 
ing market shares toward large, low marginal cost plants and reducing average 
variable costs. 
To  describe  the  conditions under which  trade liberalization induces such 
shifts, it is convenient to assume a linear demand schedule with both the inter- 
cept and the slope dependent upon trade regime: 
(4)  P  = 01  -  PQ, 
O1  = O1(0),  p = p(n). 




ci + CCi  p=- 
(n +  1)’ 
01  + Cc, - c,(n  +  1) 
P(n + 1) 
,  j= 1,  n.  4, = 
From these equations, the effect of demand shifts induced by trade reforms 
follow easily. Suppose that, beginning from autarky and binding QRs, trade 
is liberalized. This type of reform has the effect of placing domestic producers 
in large world markets where there are many other producers and substitute 
products. Regardless of whether the domestic product is exportable or import 
competing, one would expect its demand elasticity to rise. We isolate the con- 
sequences of such an elasticity increase by pivoting the demand curve through 
the pre-reform equilibrium point, reducing both ci and p. By equation (5.2)  P 
must fall, so Q must rise, and industry-wide average fixed costs must fall. The 
market share of plant j,  qj/Q,  does not depend on p. However, reductions in 
01  increase the market share of large, low-cost plants, and thereby reduce av- 
erage variable costs for the industry.6 So trade reforms that increase the elas- 
ticity of demand without shifting it inward reduce average costs, both by shift- 
ing production  toward  low-cost producers  and by  increasing  industry-wide 
output. 
6. More precisely, the market share of thejth plant expands as a  falls if c, is less than Ccln. 173  Size Rationalization and Trade Exposure 
Of course elasticity effects are not the only possible effect of increased for- 
eign competition. Trade reforms that amount to tariff reductions or real cur- 
rency appreciation may  act mainly to reduce domestic demand for import- 
competing products. If this causes a contraction in total output, average fixed 
costs will rise for the affected industries, at least partly offsetting any fall in 
average variable costs. Although many simulation models allow for this con- 
tractionary effect of liberalization, it has not usually proved to be dominant.’ 
Now  consider the adjustments that occur when entry and exit are possible. 
Suppose trade liberalization shifts demand inward (reduces a),  with or with- 
out an increase in elasticity. By  equation (5.2), P must fall, so the smallest, 
least efficient firms will begin to take losses and exit, reducing both n and 
ZC~.~  In  the initial equilibrium c,  5  P (eq. [3]), so before price adjusts this 
exit will have reduced nP more than it reduced Zci. Accordingly, to restore 
equilibrium Q must contact more and P  must fall less than they would have if 
exit were not possible (eq.  [2]). In  sum, compared to the case of  no exit, 
efficiency effects are stronger for two reasons: The least efficient plants leave 
the market entirely, and remaining plants face less contractionary pressure. 
By analogous logic, free entry and exit exacerbate the reduction in productive 
efficiency associated with outward shifts of the demand curve, as might ac- 
company quotas or increases in the tariff rate: Small, inefficient firms are in- 
duced to enter and take market shares from incumbents. This consequence of 
market expansion through protection is another familiar story in  the litera- 
ture. 
6.2.3  Robustness 
Though far from comprehensive, the exposition above gives an idea of the 
size rationalization effects that have  recently been stressed in  literature. In 
particular, exposure to foreign competition can increase plants’ size by  in- 
creasing the elasticity of  demand. Even if  exposure to competition reduces 
plant size by contracting demand, it is likely to hit the most inefficient plants 
hardest. Hence, unless returns to scale are important, efficiency gains are still 
likely. Finally, the positive effects of liberalization are larger when entry and 
exit are possible because inefficient plants will be forced out of  the market, 
allowing those producers who remain behind to operate on a larger scale. 
Although these effects are often stressed, they are not guaranteed. There is 
no reason why liberalizations might not contract demand for domestic prod- 
ucts so severely as to increase average costs-particularly  when  fixed costs 
and entry barriers are significant. Moreover, as various authors have shown, 
alternative analytic frameworks expand the range of  possible outcomes. For 
7. An exception is de Melo and Tarr (forthcoming). 
8. To  see this, note that the demand function (4) and the profit maximization condition (1) imply 
9. Although their models are different, the same conclusions are stressed in Eastman and Sty- 
qf = (p  -  cf)/p,  j  = I,  n. If P falls, qi  must fall, and so average costs at the ith plant must rise. 
kolt (1966), Dixit and Norman (1980), and Harris (1984). 174  Mark J. Roberts and James R. ’Qbout 
example, if  static Cournot quantity competition is replaced with another type 
of competition, firms adjust their output levels differently in response to de- 
mand shifts. The monotonic negative relationship between plant size and av- 
erage variable costs might then be broken, and it would no longer necessarily 
hold  that  shifting production toward large plants improves efficiency. Still 
more outcomes are possible if one endogenizes marginal costs, allowing for 
changes in factor prices, X-efficiency, and learning-by-doing. Finally, domes- 
tic product differentiation can be introduced. This not only opens the possibil- 
ity of cross-plant variation in the degree of competition from foreign substi- 
tutes, it also allows endogenous adjustments in the length of production runs. 
Given these qualifications, it is clearly an empirical question whether trade 
liberalization will (1) increase the average scale of production, (2) shift mar- 
ket shares toward large producers, and (3) bring with it productivity improve- 
ment. The remainder of this paper is devoted to an econometric examination 
of these issues. 
6.3  Empirical Methodology 
6.3.1  The Data and Country Backgrounds 
In  this section we  examine cross-country and  intertemporal contrasts in 
trade exposure, plant size distributions, and labor productivity distributions 
for evidence on the empirical relevance of  the theoretical effects reviewed in 
section 6.2. To  do this we  utilize annual census data covering all manufac- 
turing plants with at least ten  workers in Colombia and Chile.’O But before 
turning to the empirical models these data support, it is useful to review the 
cross-country differences and within-country time series fluctuations in trade 
policies and industrial performance that allow us to identify parameters. 
Chile 
The Chilean data used  in this paper cover the period  1979-85;  we  begin 
our overview  with  the  years  immediately preceding.  Like  much  of  Latin 
America,  Chile  pursued  an  inward-oriented development  strategy  in  the 
1960s. The system of  incentives-including  tariffs,  quotas, exchange rate 
policy, and domestic market regulations-favored  manufacturing at the ex- 
pense of  agriculture and import-competing producers over exporters (Corbo 
1985). This bias intensified in the early  1970s. By  1973 average tariff  rates 
exceeded 100 percent, prior deposit requirements for importers created heavy 
10. The governments of  Chile and Colombia have recently made these data available to the 
World Bank in connection with the World Bank research project “Industrial Competition, Produc- 
tive Efficiency,  and Their Relation to Trade Regimes”  (RPO 674-46).  They are described in 
Roberts (1989) and Tybout (1989). Our discussion of Chile is based on Tybout (1989); our discus- 
sion of  Colombia is based on Roberts (1989). 175  Size Rationalization and  Trade Exposure 
additional surcharges, and a complex system of multiple exchange rates pre- 
vailed. 
In  1973, the military seized power and began implementing radical policy 
changes. In  addition to fiscal austerity and price stabilization programs, the 
new  government rapidly implemented laissez-faire micro reforms. The new 
administration sold public enterprises, decontrolled prices and interest rates, 
and dismantled trade barriers. The average nominal tariff  rate fell from 105 
percent in 1974 to 12 percent in 1979. 
Although the industrial sector initially suffered from recessionary macro 
conditions, recovery began in 1976 and continued into 1981. Several features 
of  this recovery were noteworthy. First, the reductions in industrial employ- 
ment that accompanied the 1974-75  recession continued during the 1976-8 1 
recovery, so that labor productivity increased dramatically. Second, the bal- 
ance of  trade in industrial products worsened considerably during the latter 
part of  the recovery period. The trade liberalization was partly responsible, 
but there was also considerable exchange-rate appreciation beginning in 1979. 
Third,  during  1976-81  a  handful  of  powerful  conglomerates  (grupos) 
emerged  and  consolidated control over both  financial and  industrial enter- 
prises. 
By the end of  1982, the Chilean economy was again in serious trouble. The 
exchange rate had been overvalued for some time, and tradable sector produc- 
ers had undergone a protracted profit squeeze. Large capital inflows were nec- 
essary to finance the current account deficit, yet international credit was evap- 
orating, exacerbating firms’ financial stress with very high interest rates. The 
government finally devalued, but the financial soundness of the economy had 
already been undermined,  and a major recession followed. Unemployment 
reached roughly 30 percent in 1983. 
To  help the economy recover, the government took various steps to ease 
firms’ financial problems. This relief, in  addition to devaluation, a mild in- 
crease in tariff protection, and a reduction in the corporate income tax from 38 
percent to  10 percent, facilitated a quick industrial sector recovery.  As the 
recovery continued, average tariff levels were gradually dropped, falling from 
a peak of 36 percent in September 1984 to 15 percent in 1988. 
To summarize, our sample period includes the end of a major trade liberal- 
ization and economic recovery (1979-81),  a severe recession that was accom- 
panied by devaluation and mild increases in protection (1982-83),  and a sus- 
tained  recovery  with  a  return to  very  low  levels of  protection.  Table 6.1 
presents time series on trade exposure and average workers per plant (an index 
of  average plant size). Note that the ratio of  imports to output grew substan- 
tially over the period 1979-82,  then fell (with devaluation and increased pro- 
tection) after 1982. Both total manufacturing employment and average plant 
size declined continuously after 1979 until the recovery began in 1984. 
Popular sentiment has it that the Chilean industrial sector is now one of the 176  Mark J. Roberts and James R. @bout 
most efficient in Latin America. Although the government's approach to anti- 
trust policy is essentially laissez-faire, it is commonly held that the discipline 
of foreign competition prevents firms from exercising much market power and 
forces inefficient firms to reform or shut down. The grupos are still in  evi- 
dence, but they too are considered efficient competitors by most observers. 
Colombia 
The Colombian data base spans 1977-87  but, as with Chile, it is instructive 
to begin with a review of years preceding. In  1967, the Colombian govern- 
ment began to abandon its traditional inward-looking development strategy in 
favor of  export promotion policies, a modest degree of  trade liberalization, 
and  greater exchange-rate flexibility. Exports were  encouraged with  duty- 
drawback schemes, tax incentives, and special credit facilities. Imports were 
liberalized by  scaling back prior licensing requirements, eliminating prohib- 
ited lists, and reducing average nominal tariff rates." 
During this period of export promotion and trade liberalization there was 
growth in the aggregate economy as well as in the volume of  imports and 
exports. Real GDP grew at an annual average rate of  6.3 percent over the 
1967-75  period, and the manufacturing sector grew at an annual rate of  8.8 
percent. But beginning in late 1975, significant changes in Colombia's mac- 
roeconomic  environment began  to  influence trade  policy  and  the real  ex- 
change rate. Specifically, substantial increases in world coffee prices and in- 
creased foreign borrowing contributed to  large foreign exchange inflows, 
which resulted in increased inflation. Substantial real appreciation resulted, 
which tended to hurt tradable goods producers in the industrial sector. Ac- 
cordingly, between 1976 and the early 1980s, efforts to liberalize the trade 
regime proceeded at a slower pace. 
The trend toward liberalization stalled completely in the early  1980s. In 
1980, approximately 69 percent of  all commodities did not require import 
licenses. But in 198  1 only 36 percent of all commodities were classified in the 
free import category, and this percentage fell continuously through 1984. By 
that time only 0.5 percent of  all commodities could be  freely imported, 83 
percent required licenses, and  16.5 percent were prohibited. Liberalization 
resumed in 1985 and 1986 but not enough to return to 1980 levels. 
The time series patterns in Colombian trade exposure are reported in table 
6.1. There is a marked increase in import penetration and a marked decline in 
export shares over the period of  currency appreciation, 1977-82.  Over the 
same period,  total  manufacturing employment and  average plant  size de- 
clined. Finally, note the contrasts between Chile and Colombia in  terms of 
11. In  1971 approximately 3 percent of  all commodities could be freely imported, 81 percent 
required licenses, and the remaining 16 percent were prohibited. By 1974 approximately 30 per- 
cent of all commodities on the  tariff  schedule could be  freely imported and the  remaining 70 
percent required prior licensing (Garcia 1988, table 2.1).  Also, nominal tariff rates had fallen to 
an  average of 32 percent. 177  Size Rationalization and Trade Exposure 
Table 6.1  Wade Exposure and Market Size in Colombia and Chile 
Total 
Import Share’  Export Shareb  Employment‘  Plant Sized 





























































































”Manufactured  imports as a share of domestic manufactured output. 
bManufactured exports as a share of  domestic manufactured output. 
cTotal manufacturing employment, in thousands. 
dAverage  number of  workers per plant in the manufacturing sector. 
trade exposure, total industrial employment, and average plant size. Both the 
total manufacturing sector and the average plant size are larger in Colombia. 
Moreover, imports, and to a lesser degree exports, are small in Colombia as a 
share of  domestic production. This partly reflects differences in the size of the 
two countries but probably also reflects Colombian trade policy, which never 
came close to the degree of openness found in Chile.I2 For example, while 
Chile essentially eliminated QRs, they remained a prominent feature of  Co- 
lombian trade policy throughout the sample period. Similarly, while Chile had 
achieved uniform  10  percent tariffs by  1979, Colombian  tariffs  remained 
around 30 percent after substantial cuts in 1974. 
6.3.2  An Empirical Framework for Plant Size and Productivity Analysis 
As noted in  section 6.2, theory alone cannot tell us the qualitative, much 
less quantitative, relationship between trade exposure and cross-plant distri- 
butions of  size or productivity. Yet  econometric evidence on the association 
between these variables is almost nonexistent. Therefore, to generate some 
new  “stylized facts,” we now develop empirical models that summarize the 
correlations between these variables using country- and time-specific data on 
three-digit manufacturing industries in  Chile and Colombia. To  distinguish 
short-run and long-run correlations, two types of models will be used-those 
that exploit cross-country variation in trade exposure and size or productivity 
12. Colombian per  capita income is a bit lower than that of Chile, but Colombia has more than 
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distributions,  and those that exploit variation within countries over time. Both 
types of models will control for industry effects, domestic market  size, and 
ease of entry and exit. 
We begin by constructing some measures of the plant size distribution for 
industry i, country j,  and year t.  For each (i, j,  t ) combination we rank plants 
by ascending employment level and find the employment levels of plants at 
the  loth, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th per~enti1es.I~  Similarly,  to summarize 
productivity distributions  for each observation,  we rank plants by output per 
worker and find cut-offs for the same percentiles.  We thereby generate five 
summary  measures of  the  cross-plant  size  distribution,  and  five  summary 
measures of the cross-plant labor productivity distribution: 
In(EMPk,J  = Logarithm of the kth percentile of  the employment size dis- 
ln(PRDk,J,) = Logarithm of the kth percentile of  the productivity (output 
One by one, each of these summary measures is regressed on proxies for 
product  market conditions, inter  ah.  This approach permits  us to analyze 
changes in  the shape  of  the size  and  productivity  distributions  as  well  as 
changes in the median size. We express all percentiles in logarithms to facili- 
tate analysis of their rates of change and the associated shifts in output shares. 
For industry i, countryj, year t,  the explanatory variables we work with are: 
tribution (k = 10, 25, 50, 75, 90) 
per man) distribution (k = 10, 25, 50, 75, 90) 
lnQtIl 
In (M/Q),,, = Log of  the ratio of imports to output 
In (X/Q),], = Log of  the ratio of exports to output 
TUR!, 
= Log of real industry output 
- 
= Mean turnover rate. The turnover rate is the sum of the in- 
dustry’s entry and exit rates. These rates are averaged across 
all  years  for each industry in each country to get a “long- 
run” value that is specific to each industry in each country. 
= Log of  the mean effective rate of protection. Given that Chi- 
lean  protection  was  essentially  uniform  during  the  sample 
period, variation  in  this protection  measure  is due only to 
Colombia. For Chile, we  set this variable  at 0. Colombian 
figures  are  averages  of  effective  protection  measures  for 
1979,  1984,  and  1985  reported  in  Cubillos  and  Torres 
(1987). 




13. Because of various data problems, the manufacturing industries 31 1, 312, 314, 353, 354, 
361, 372, and 385 are not included in the analysis. This leaves twenty-one three-digit industries 
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Here 1nQ proxies total market size, while ln(X/Q) and ln(M/Q) proxy expo- 
sure to international markets.  (When interpreting coefficients on these latter 
variables, it must be kept in mind that the regression  - has already controlled 
for total output.) The average turnover rate, TUR, is used as a measure of the 
extent, and thus the ease, of entry and exit into an industry over time. High 
turnover rates are consistent with low sunk costs of entry and hence should 
reflect the potential for competitive pressures from domestic rivals.  As  dis- 
cussed in  section 6.2, the  sensitivity of  size distributions  to demand shifts 
should depend on the ease of entry and exit. We therefore interact our turnover 
variable with the trade variables in the regression equations. Finally, to control 
for the industry-specific technology effects and country-specific macro condi- 
tions, represented by  A  and F, respectively, industry and time dummies are 
included.  l4  Equation (7) can also be estimated using productivity percentiles, 
In(PRDk), as dependent variables. 
As seen in table 6.1, there are fairly significant and persistent cross-country 
differences in trade exposure and average plant size, but plant size fluctuations 
within each country over time are smaller. This suggests that the pattems of 
correlation will depend upon the type of estimator applied to the panel data. 
For example if  we use a “between” estimator, parameters are identified with 
cross-country  differences  in  the  (temporal)  mean  values  of  the  variables. 
These estimates are obtained with OLS on equation (7) averaged across time:I5 
Parameter estimates of p,  in this model will reflect country-wide contrasts 
between the Chilean and Colombian size distributions, while A, estimates will 
reflect technological and other industry-specific factors common to both coun- 
tries  that determine the  size distribution  for industry  i.  The remaining  pa- 
rameters reflect  correlations  once these  factors are controlled for.  Because 
variables are averaged over time, the estimates might be viewed as reflecting 
long-run correlations.  To examine the robustness of our findings to alterna- 
tive measures of  trade exposure, we will also estimate the model using the 
effect rate of protection (ERP) rather than ln(X/Q) and In(MlQ). 
14. Because the turnover rate we construct has no time variation, the coefficient p,  cannot be 
identified separately from A,,.  Thus no p,  values are reported with eq. (7) estimates. 
15. Here it is not possible to identify separate country effects for each industry because obser- 
vations have been averaged over time. Hence the industry effects, A,, do not have a j  subscript. 
16. Recall, however, that the sample countries underwent significant changes in trade orienta- 
tion from the presample to the sample years; so if adjustment is slow, even the “between” estimates 
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An alternative estimator of  equation (7) does not involve averaging over 
time. Rather, it identifies parameters by treating a single industry, country, and 
year as the unit of observation. If we control for technology differences with 
country-specific  industry  dummies, and  we control  for macro effects with 
country-specific time dummies, the resultant  “within” estimates will reflect 
the  time-series  correlations of  the  size and productivity  distributions  with 
industry-specific trade policy. These estimates address the question of  how 
much rationalization occurs within a country in the short run as trade exposure 
changes. They will be more sensitive to hysteresis effects than the “between” 
estimates, so entry and exit are likely to play a smaller role in the short run. 
Bear in mind also that this estimator will not pick up the dynamics of adjust- 
ment processes-all  correlations are contemporaneous. Finally, given that the 
variable ERP does not vary through time, we are unable to check the robust- 
ness of  our “within” regression  by  replacing ln(X/Q) and ln(M/Q) with the 
effective rate of protection. 
6.4  Results: Between-Country Estimates 
6.4.1  The Employment Size Distribution 
Table 6.2 presents regression coefficients for the employment size distribu- 
tion using the “between” estimator. Explanatory variables are listed on the 
left-hand side of the table and percentiles across the top. Each column in each 
panel summarizes a separate regression.  The top panel was estimated using 
import and export shares as the measure of trade exposure and the bottom 
panel was estimated using effective rates of protection. Note that, overall, the 
fit as measured by adjusted R2  is very tight, and both trade patterns and turn- 
over appear to matter a great deal. ’’  (F-statistics test the null hypothesis that 
all variables listed and industry dummies have zero coefficients.) 
Looking across columns in the top half of table 6.2, one sees that an in- 
crease in import share is associated with a reduction in all size percentiles, 
controlling for the level of industry output. These results suggest that, con- 
trary to the findings of many simulation models, the elasticity effects of im- 
port competition on plant size are not dominant. Rather, demand contraction, 
factor market effects, and other forces associated with increased import com- 
petition apparently lead to smaller plants.’* We defer the issue of whether this 
means efficiency losses accompany liberalization to section 6.4.3 below. 
Notice next that large plants appear to contract relatively more in the face 
17. Interestingly, the country dummy is insignificant in the employment regressions, suggesting 
that any cross-country contrast in the size distribution is associated with contrasts in the explana- 
tory variables. (Country dummies in the productivity regressions of table 6.4 reflect differences in 
units of measurement, inter alia.) 
18. Baldwin and Gorecki (1983) found similar effects in Canadian data, although they did not 
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Table 6.2  Between Estimates of Employment Size Distribution' 
(absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
Percentile 
10th  25th  50th  75th  90th 






TUR * In(M/Q) 
TUR * In(X/Q) 
TUR * In(Q) 
Chile dummy 











TUR * ERP 
TUR * In(Q) 
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-  .  l84* 
(2.59) 
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(6.24) 
















-  .317* 
(2.78) 
-  .333* 
(6.36) 











-  -  14.17* 




-  .432 
(2.03) 
(3.76) 








-  .039 








-  .573* 
(2.24) 
-  ,168 
(1.43) 








-  .564 
(1.06) 
















.  I88 
(.  254) 
-  ,722 
(.935) 






Trade Exposure Measured with Effective Protection Rates 
.244*  .352*  .361  ,332  ,368 
(3.41)  (2.52)  (1.78)  (1.97)  (1.36) 
.296*  ,422  ,545  1.15*  1.24* 
(2.39)  (I  .78)  (1.58)  (4.03)  (2.70) 
14.05*  19.08  21.96  43.73*  45.28 
(2.33)  (1.64)  (1.31)  (3.13)  (2.03) 
-  .707*  -  1.05*  -  1.01*  -  1.04*  -1.11 
(4.45)  (3.43)  (2.29)  (2.84)  (1.89) 
-  .876*  -1.18  -  1.41  -  2.67*  -  2.73 
(2.29)  (1.62)  (1.32)  (3.03)  (1.93) 
,003  -  .038  -.I13  -  ,517  -  ,474 
(.014)  (.097)  (.198)  (1.09)  (.623) 
2.47  2.80  3.37  4.15  4.99 
.664  ,587  ,596  ,836  .647 
.080  .153  ,222  ,185  ,296 
4.12  3.24  3.33  9.02  3.89 
~ 
%dustry  dummies were included in the regressions but are not reported. 
*Significantly different from zero at the .05  level using a two-tail test. 182  Mark J. Roberts and James R. ’Qbout 
of import competition, so even the market share effects of trade liberalization 
appear to be absent.  This result is not as robust as the negative correlation 
between trade exposure and size, as will be seen presently. Nonetheless, pos- 
sible explanations are worth listing. First, drawing on the simple analytics of 
section 6.3, it is possible that trade exposure actually reduces demand elastic- 
ities. Second, and more plausibly, it may be that imported goods do not com- 
pete with the kinds of goods small plants produce, so large plants bear most 
of the adjustment burden.  Third, industries with large plants  may  be more 
effective at lobbying for import protection. 
The coefficients on the interaction between TUR and ln(M/Q) are signifi- 
cantly positive,  which implies that the size effect of  trade exposure is more 
substantial in low-turnover industries.  Given that import expansion is asso- 
ciated with output contraction, this is consistent with the theory reviewed ear- 
lier: More size adjustment occurs when exit is not easy. Alternatively, the re- 
sults  might  be  interpreted  to  mean  simply  that  the  discipline  of  foreign 
competition matters more in industries where the discipline of potential entry 
is less important.  Here again,  the larger effect for the higher percentiles is 
consistent with the hypothesis that imports compete more directly  with big 
plants.  In  either case, the  data  support  Buffie  and  Spiller  (1986),  Rodrik 
(1988a),  and others who have argued that it is critical to take ease of entry 
into consideration when predicting the effect of regime changes on size distri- 
butions. 
Turning next to export shares, one finds the direction of the effects is simi- 
lar: High trade exposure is associated with smaller plant sizes, and the effect 
is strongest in industries with low turnover. This pattern is generally support- 
ive of the premise that both ln(X/Q) and ln(M/Q) measure exposure to foreign 
markets. However, the effect of  ln(X/Q) now weakens as we move to higher 
percentiles, so most of the contrast between “open” and “closed’ markets ap- 
pears to be showing up among small plants. This same pattern holds for the 
interaction between ln(X/Q) and TUR. We have no ready explanation for this 
finding,  but  it may  indicate that small plants  are relatively  more important 
export suppliers. 
Given import and export shares, larger industry-wide output levels have an 
effect on the  size distribution  that is qualitatively  identical to that of  trade 
exposure. Larger domestic production is associated with relatively more small 
producers, especially in low-turnover industries. However, it must be remem- 
bered that ln(Q) enters the variables In(X/Q) and ln(M/Q) negatively. Hence, 
the total effect of an increase in output holding M and X  fixed is given by the 
sum of the output coefficient and the negative of the import and export coeffi- 
cients. For example, a unit increase in ln(Q) holding X and M  fixed shifts the 
10th percentile rightward by  .184  + .204 - .268 > 0. The negative coeffi- 
cient on output in the regression equations implied that a proportionate in- 
crease in Q. X, and M is associated with a smaller size distribution of plants. 
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controls for country-specific differences in turnover rates. These can be due to 
cross-country differences in product mixes within given industries, or to dif- 
ferences in credit markets and other determinants of sunk costs.19  The pattern 
that emerges is expected: High turnover is associated with a relatively large 
number of small plants. 
To check the robustness of the findings concerning trade exposure and plant 
size, we next replace the trade exposure measures ln(X/Q) and In(M/Q) with 
the effective protection measure ERP.*O The coefficient on ERP in the regres- 
sions can be interpreted as the difference in size distributions that is correlated 
with  differences in  effective protection rates,  controlling for country-wide 
plant-size differences, and for industry-specific effects. 
Results are reported in the bottom half of table 6.2.  Note first that there is a 
positive correlation of the employment size distributions with effective protec- 
tion. Just as with the X/Q and M/Q measures of  trade exposure, higher rates 
of  effective protection are associated with larger plant sizes. Moreover, the 
size effect is less extreme in high turnover industries. In both these senses the 
results conform to the findings in the top half of table 6.2:  Demand contrac- 
tion and other effects associated with high trade exposure appear to dominate 
elasticity effects. 
However, comparing the different size percentiles, one finds that the statis- 
tically significant effects of  increased protection appear in the lower percen- 
tiles, which suggests that small plants expand at a relatively rapid rate when 
protection is increased. Contrary to our earlier findings, these results are con- 
sistent with the hypothesis that trade exposure increases demand elasticities, 
thereby inducing rationalization by forcing small plants to contract relatively 
more. 
Finally, in the ERP regressions we see that larger domestic production and 
higher turnover are both associated with rightward shifts in the size distribu- 
tion. Both of these patterns are present across all the percentiles. This same 
pattern was reported in the top half of table 6.2  for the 75th and 90th percen- 
tiles. However, the  10th through 50th percentiles tended to decline with in- 
creased output or turnover in the regressions based on In(X/Q) and In(M/Q). 
These do not strike us as important anomalies because, as discussed above, 
the size shift associated with output increases is positive for all table 6.2  per- 
centiles when X and M are held fixed. Also, our turnover variable is mainly 
useful in interaction terms; the level effects of entry barriers are essentially 
controlled for with industry dummies. 
To  summarize the robustness of the “between” estimates, we conclude that 
19. Recall that Chile underwent a major financial crisis and restructuring in the early 1980s. 
20. We also repeated these regressions using real output, rather than employment, as the mea- 
sure of plant size. The qualitative results are very similar for the two measures. Overall, shifts 
toward smaller plants are associated with high trade exposure, especially in low-turnover indus- 
tries. In  the output size distribution, however, only the effect of  export share was consistently 
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the correlation between trade exposure and the employment size distribution 
is clearly negative in the long run, and the magnitude of the effect is clearly 
moderated by ease of entry or exit.21  However, whether small or large plants 
adjust more in percentage terms to increases in exposure depends on the mea- 
sure of exposure that is used. Perhaps effective protection measures are most 
relevant for policy  analysis,  since these are most directly  controlled  by  the 
government. 
6.4.2  Predicted Employment Size Distribution under Alternative Trade 
Regimes 
Given that the regression models use interaction  terms between  turnover 
and trade exposure, it is difficult to infer the magnitudes of predicted differ- 
ences in the employment size distribution under alternative trade regimes. Ac- 
cordingly, table 6.3 presents predicted  values of  the employment size distri- 
butions based on regression results from table 6.2. 
The top panel illustrates how the employment size distribution shifts as the 
import share rises, the middle panel illustrates how it shifts as the export share 
rises, and the bottom panel illustrates shifts with changes in effective protec- 
tion. The left side of the table describes a low turnover industry while the right 
side corresponds to a high turnover industry. Within each panel, columns pre- 
sent “low”, “medium,” and “high” export or import shares.22  Finally, rows of 
the table give predicted employment levels for the 5th through 95th percen- 
tiles, as well as the mean and standard deviation of the employment distribu- 
tion. 
First, focusing on the size distribution for low-turnover industries, the left- 
ward shift in the size distribution  as import shares increase is marked.  For 
example, the median plant size falls from 3 1.9 to 20.5 employees as the im- 
port share rises. This leftward shift is particularly large for the 75th, 90th, and 
95th percentiles.  Similarly,  both  the mean  and  the standard deviation drop 
substantially with increases in import share. Recall, however, that high turn- 
over moderates the extent to which import shares reduce plant size. This ap- 
pears in table 6.3 when one moves from the low-turnover to the high-turnover 
figures, especially among large plants. 
Relative to import shares, export shares appear to covary less with the em- 
ployment sizedistribution.  Forexample, among low-turnoverindustries, the me- 
dian plant size declines only from 27.3 to 26.5 employees as the export share 
increases.  Also,  although  plants  in  high-turnover  industries  are  generally 
21. Similar results were obtained when plant-level output was used as a size measure instead of 
employment (see n. 20). 
22. The “low-turnover” predictions assume the turnover rate associated with the 25th percentile 
of the turnover distribution, and “high-turnover” predictions assume the turnover rate of the 75th 
percentile.  Low, medium, and high trade exposure measures correspond to the 25th, 50th, and 
75th percentiles of their respective distributions. 185  Size Rationalization and Trade Exposure 
Table 6.3  Predicted Employment Size Distribution under Alternative Levels 
of 'kade Exposure 
Low-'hrnover Industries  High-Turnover Industries 
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more concentrated in the lower employment ranges, changes in export shares 
appear to have little effect on location or shape of the distribution. 
The bottom panel of table 6.3 reports predicted percentiles of the size dis- 
tribution when the effective rate of protection is varied. The most substantial 
change occurs in the upper percentiles of the size distribution for low-turnover 
industries.  Increases in the effective rate of protection are correlated with an 
increase in the size of the larger plants, but the increase is not as large as that 
associated with changes in import penetration. 
6.4.3  Distribution of  Labor Productivity 
The empirical results thus far have shown that high trade exposure is asso- 
ciated  with  relatively  small-scale  production,  controlling  for other  factors. 
Does this mean that trade exposure worsens  productivity?  To examine this 
issue more directly, we next apply our empirical model to the distribution of 
labor productivity  across plants.  This not  only  allows  us to determine the 
overall direction of productivity  shifts with trade exposure, it also speaks to 
such questions as whether shifts are concentrated among the least productive 
plants. 
Table 6.4 reports “between-country’’ regression results for the percentiles 
of the labor productivity distribution. The top half of the table measures trade 
exposure with import and export shares while the bottom half uses effective 
rates of protection. The first result to notice is that significance levels are much 
lower than those associated with size distributions.  Hence reductions in labor 
productivity do not obviously accompany reductions in scale. Notice next that 
differences in  the  import share between  countries  are positively  correlated 
with differences in the percentiles of the productivity distribution,  while the 
export share is negatively correlated. This negative correlation of  exports and 
productivity  could  reflect  the limitations  of  single-factor  productivity  mea- 
sures: low labor productivity  may be due to high labor intensity without im- 
plying low total factor productivity, since capital is not controlled for. More- 
over,  the  Heckscher-Ohlin models suggests that  trade  liberalization  should 
stimulate exports of labor-intensive products, so this omitted variable bias in 
our productivity measure will be correlated with trade patterns. 
Larger levels of industry  output, holding import and export shares fixed, 
are correlated with  a rightward  shift  in  the  labor productivity  distribution. 
This could reflect increased capacity utilization or exploitation of scale econ- 
omies in the larger market. High-turnover industries also have higher produc- 
tivity  levels.  As  was  seen in  the  employment distributions,  high  turnover 
tends to reduce the magnitude of the import, export, and output correlations. 
Finally,  the country dummy variable  is positive  and  significant.  This can 
simply reflect  differences in the units of  measurement  of  output.  However, 
with the exception of the country dummy and output level among higher pro- 
ductivity  plants,  virtually  none of  the remaining  coefficients  is statistically 
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Table 6.4  Between Estimates of Labor Productivity Distribution' 
(absolute values of &statistics in parentheses) 
Percentile 
10th  25th  50th  75th  90th 
TUR 
TUR * In(M/Q) 
TUR * In(X/Q) 
TUR * In@)  . 
Chile dummy 












TUR * ERP 
TUR * In@) 
Chile dummy 








Trade Exposure Measured with Import and Export Shares 
,158  ,239  .230  ,289  ,398 
(.474)  (.898)  (.890)  (1.08)  (1.58) 
~  ,271  -  .258*  -  ,089  -  ,045  -.186 
(1.81)  (2.16)  (.764)  (.372)  (1.64) 
(.775)  (I .44)  (1.88)  (2.38)  (2.44) 
8.26  8.81  7.26  9.27  6.46 
(.754)  (1.01)  (.  854)  (1.05)  (.780) 
(.SO)  (1.05)  (1.18)  (1.17)  (I  .54) 
.910  .806  ,107  -  ,064  .513 
(I .40)  (1.55)  (.213)  (.122)  (1.04) 
,260  .387  ,490  .643*  .619* 
-  .389  -  .592  -  ,644  -  ,667  -  .824 
-  .495  -.516  -  ,547  -  ,618  -  .312 
(.708)  (.926)  (1.01)  (1.10)  (.589) 
1.91*  1.88*  1.85*  1.72*  1.55* 
(5.65)  (7.00)  (7.09)  (6.32)  (6.06) 
4.56  5.02  5.52  6.07  6.58 
.963  ,978  ,981  ,980  ,983 
,224  ,177  .I74  ,181  ,170 
38.94  67.28  75.56  73.14  83.32 
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&Industry  dummies were included in the regressions but are not reported 
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here that productivity differences across the two countries are related to trade 
exposure. 
The bottom half of  table 6.4 reports regression results using the effective 
rate of  protection as the measure of  trade exposure.  Again, output and turn- 
over are correlated with a rightward shift in the productivity distribution. In- 
creased trade protection is correlated with higher productivity, especially for 
the least productive plants, but once again, none of  these coefficients is statis- 
tically significant. In short, there is no clear evidence that differences in trade 
exposure between  sectors in Colombia and Chile are correlated with differ- 
ences in the distribution of plant-level labor productivity. 
6.5  Results: Within-Country Estimates 
As reviewed  in section 6.3, an alternative way to identify our model is to 
use the within-country temporal variation in the data. This approach picks up 
the short-run associations between trade exposure, output levels, and the size 
and productivity distributions. The top panel of table 6.5 presents results for 
the employment size distribution and the lower panel presents results for the 
productivity  distrib~tion.~~  (F-statistics  test  the  null  hypothesis that  all re- 
ported  variables,  time  dummies,  and  industry  dummies  have  zero  coeffi- 
cients.) 
6.5.1  Employment Size Distribution 
Fluctuations in import shares show a negative association with plant sizes, 
just as in all the “between” country regressions.  Now, however, this associa- 
tion is so weak statistically that it makes little sense to talk of short-run ration- 
alization effects. Because we are limiting the “within” model to contempora- 
neous effects, we find this low significance unsurprising. 
More surprisingly, time series fluctuations in export shares correlate posi- 
tively with the percentiles of the size distribution, although they are negatively 
correlated with percentiles in the “between” regressions. Though weaker than 
in table 6.2, these correlations are still statistically significant. So in the short 
run, output growth due to export share expansion is associated with relatively 
rapid employment growth. In terms of rationalization, the growth in employ- 
ment is concentrated among large plants. We see no obvious explanation for 
this contrast between the “within” and the “between” results. 
The coefficients on the output variable indicates that the correlation of in- 
23. The “within” estimator, unlike the “between” estimator, permits us to test the null hypoth- 
esis that the same relationship between size and trade exposure holds in all industries. But to do 
so, we must drop our time dummies and our turnover index. Not surprisingly, for this restricted 
version of the model the hypothesis of common slope coefficients across industries can be rejected 
for all the employment and productivity percentiles. Specifically, the F( 120,210) statistics for the 
loth, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th employment percentiles are 5.12, 9.03, 10.60, 9.10, and 7.63, 
respectively. The same statistics for the productivity percentiles are 2.81, 2.70, 1.94, 2.47,  and 
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dustrial output with plant sizes is generally positive. This reflects a combina- 
tion of output adjustments by incumbents and entry or exit. However, given 
that most turnover takes place among small plants, shifts in the higher percen- 
tiles reflect mainly  the expansion and  contraction of  incumbents (Roberts 
1989; vbout 1989). Finally, in industries where turnover is high, the positive 
correlation between output and size is relatively muted. 
Overall, the patterns of contemporaneous correlation between the percen- 
tiles of  the employment size distribution are much less systematic than the 
between country estimates. Systematic rightward or leftward movements of 
the size distribution are not obvious in the regression results. This suggests 
that while the across-country differences in trade exposure are correlated with 
differences in the entire size distribution of plants, the time-series differences 
in trade appear to have a more random effect on plants within the size distri- 
bution. This may mean that differences in the plant-size distribution between 
the countries reflect underlying structural differences in the size of markets, 
openness to trade, and other factors. In  contrast, time-series fluctuations in 
the size distribution within each industry and country reflect idiosyncratic as- 
pects of the market and time period. 
6.5.2  Labor Productivity Distribution 
The bottom half of table 6.5 reports results for the labor productivity distri- 
bution using the within-country variation. Import share has no significant ef- 
fect on the shape of  the distribution. In contrast, an increase in  the export 
share is positively and significantly correlated with the loth, 25th, and 50th 
percentiles of the productivity distribution but negatively correlated with the 
75th and 90th percentiles. That is, higher export shares are correlated with 
higher productivity for the less productive plants but lower productivity for 
higher productivity plants. 
Expansion in output over time leads to productivity improvements. This 
can result from either increased use of capital or scale economies in high out- 
put periods. Finally, as we have seen throughout this paper, the import, ex- 
port, and output correlations are lower in magnitude in high-turnover indus- 
tries. In particular, the turnover results could arise if high-turnover industries 
are less capital intensive or have technologies with less scale economies. De- 
mand  fluctuations in these industries then have less effect on an individual 
plant’s labor productivity and thus less effect on the distribution across plants. 
Overall, the “within” estimator indicates little evidence of  rationalization 
with variation in trade exposure over time. The productivity changes over time 
are largely explainable with variation in capital utilization. 
6.6  Summary 
It is often argued that when domestic markets are imperfectly competitive, 
increased exposure to global markets should rationalize production. Such ex- 190  Mark J. Roberts and James R. @bout 
Table 6.5  Between Estimates of Employment Size and Productivity 
Distribution' (absolute values of &statistics  in parentheses) 
Percentile 
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Separate industry dummies and time dummies for each country were included in the regressions 
but are not reported. 
*Significantly different from zero at the .05 level using a two-tail test. 191  Size Rationalization and Trade Exposure 
posure is believed to increase the elasticity of demand perceived by domestic 
producers,  which  in turn  should shift production  toward the large, efficient 
plants. The rationalization effects should be especially marked when there are 
low barriers to entry and exit because inefficiently small plants will be induced 
to shut down.  This paper is the  first attempt we know  of to confront these 
theories of rationalization with actual data on the size distribution  of plants 
from developing countries. 
Several striking results emerge. First,  increased  exposure to import com- 
petition  appears to clearly reduce the size of all plants in both the short run 
and the long run, but especially in the latter. Whether large plants shrink rel- 
atively less depends on the way in which we measure exposure to world mar- 
kets: Increases in import shares are associated with relatively rapid shrinkage 
by large plants, but reductions in effective protection correlate with relatively 
little shrinkage by large plants. Either way, it appears that models that predict 
trade liberalization will increase average plant size in import-competing sec- 
tors do not describe recent Chilean and Colombia experiences. This may mean 
that productivity improvements have not accompanied liberalization, but our 
findings on this issue are not strong enough to warrant much confidence in this 
conclusion. 
Second, as theory suggests, it makes a great deal of difference whether one 
is analyzing industries with high or low entry barriers. The effects of changing 
output levels, import shares, export shares, and effective protection rates are 
systematically moderated by the possibility  of  easy entry or exit. One inter- 
pretation  is that there is less role for output adjustment by  incumbent plants 
when the number of plants adjusts to demand shifts. Alternatively, our results 
could simply mean  that high turnover reflects competitive pressure and re- 
duces the marginal impact of foreign competition on market structure. 
Third, the “long-run”  correlations of  trade regimes and size distributions 
are quite different from the short-run year-to-year  correlations.  Not only are 
the effects of trade exposure stronger in the long run, but the correlations of 
export shares change sign. The short-run correlations show exports associated 
with relatively  small plants. We  trust the long-run figures more, because we 
limited our short-run analysis to simultaneous correlations and have not at- 
tempted  to  model  the  dynamics  of  adjustment.  Nonetheless,  the  short-run 
findings suggest caution in extracting policy recommendations from our fig- 
ures. 
This paper is a first step in the direction of micro-based examinations of the 
rationalization  hypothesis.  Though  suggestive,  much  remains  to  be  done. 
Aside from modeling the dynamics of adjustment, we hope to study the rela- 
tionship between average costs and size and the degree to which plants adjust 
costs endogenously with changes in the trade regime. 192  Mark J. Roberts and James R. 'Qbout 
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Comment  Robert E. Lipsey 
The basic question that motivates this study is whether trade liberalization in 
developing countries, or liberalization of  the economy in general, increases 
the efficiency of production. That is the issue the authors raise in the introduc- 
tion, it is of  great interest to development and trade economists, and it was 
apparently the question that motivated the World Bank study from which this 
paper is derived. 
A major novelty of the paper is the use of establishment data from censuses 
of  manufactures for Chile and Colombia, data that are rarely available to re- 
searchers outside the statistical agencies themselves. They are the only type 
of data that could be used to study size distributions, as is done in this paper, 
and they have the potential for examining many other broader issues involved 
in the study of the effects of trade policy. 
This paper, described by the authors as a first step in the analysis of  their 
exceptionally rich data set, focuses on one aspect of  that broader topic: an 
attempt to explain the shape of  the distribution of  manufacturing plants by 
size and the distribution by output per worker. 
One reason for relating trade policy to the size distribution of firms is that 
much of  the theoretical literature and simulation models of  trade policy as- 
sume the importance of  scale economies. Yet,  as the authors point out, the 
empirical literature has not confirmed the efficiency effects of trade liberaliza- 
tion  and,  in  particular, has not  confirmed the channel of  efficiency gains 
through effects on the size distribution of firms. 
The description of  the data brought my  mind back to a paper by  Patricio 
Meller, based on the 1967 Chilean Manufacturing Census, that confirmed for 
that country what had been found for the United States: great heterogeneity of 
establishments with respect to size and measured productivity within appar- 
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ently narrowly defined industries.  ’ Striking findings there were that 75 percent 
of  establishments operated at a level of  efficiency more than 50 percent below 
that of  the most efficient in their four-digit industries and that neither size, nor 
capital/labor ratios, nor skill ratios were systematically different between effi- 
cient and inefficient firms in the same industry. However, the dispersion was 
much smaller among large firms. In the small firm group (5-9  persons), 46 
percent of  establishments were less than a third as efficient as the most effi- 
cient establishments  in their size group. Among  large firms (100 or more), 
only 6 percent were less than a third as efficient as the firms on the efficiency 
frontier. 
What can explain the survival of  apparently inefficient enterprises? Meller 
suggested various imperfections of factor and commodity markets, especially 
in the circumstances of  1967, but also pointed out that even within four-digit 
industries, establishments are producing goods that are not substitutes. That 
is partly  a matter of geographical  isolation, but  also includes differences  in 
quality of product and in the range of products produced. 
Two of  the assumptions in the theoretical presentation  in the Roberts and 
Tybout paper seem to contradict Meller’s interpretation of  his results. One is 
the  assumption  that  “domestically  produced  goods are perfect  substitutes.” 
The other is the assumption that “firms with low marginal costs are relatively 
large.” The authors disavow  the size-marginal  cost relation as an empirical 
regularity but use it because it illustrates the working of “most analytical and 
simulation models .”  Meller reported that “it cannot be established empirically 
that one size group of industrial establishments  is more efficient from a tech- 
nical  viewpoint  than  another size  group. . . . [Llarger establishments  are 
more technically efficient than smaller establishments only in two industries.” 
The present  paper deals with  a period  in which  the Chilean economy was 
much less protected from foreign competition and in which domestic markets 
were far less regulated than in  1967,*  but it would be useful for interpreting 
the present results to know whether these earlier findings still applied. 
I did not find the theoretical framework that begins the paper very helpful 
in interpreting the results. The authors, too, need to step outside it from time 
to time in order to arrive at more intuitive interpretations of their results. An 
example is the assumption in the theoretical framework that while domestic 
products are imperfect substitutes for imports, all domestic goods in a three- 
digit industry are perfect substitutes.  In explaining why import liberalization 
appears to affect large firms more than small ones, Roberts and Tybout sug- 
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gest,  quite plausibly  but  in contradiction  to the  assumption,  that  imported 
goods do not compete with the kind  of goods small plants produce but  do 
compete with the output of large plants. 
The main  substantive results  are from what  is referred  to as “between- 
country estimates.” These compare the size of plant at each of five percentiles 
in Colombia with the size of the plant in the same industry at the same percen- 
tile in Chile. Plant size in an industry at a percentile, such as the  10th or the 
50th, is then related to a number of industry variables that may differ between 
the countries.  These includes measures of  trade exposure (export/production 
and import/production ratios and effective protection rates), of industry out- 
put, and of the turnover of firms in an industry. 
The between-country  results are described in the text as if  they involved 
changes in the variables but they are, of course, differences between the coun- 
tries.  The authors interpret these  as the  long-run effects that  would  follow 
from changes in the independent variables, but it is not always obvious that 
another interpretation would not be as plausible. For example, higher import 
ratios  in an industry  in a country  seem to be  associated with  smaller plant 
sizes. That association is referred to as resulting from a contraction of plants 
in the face of greater import competition. Another explanation that is equally 
plausible,  I think, is that imported components can be a substitute for labor 
input, and therefore the higher the ratio of imports to output in an industry, 
the smaller the employment for a given output. 
High ratios of exports to output are also associated with smaller plant em- 
ployment  size, particularly  among smaller plants.  The authors suggest that 
small plants may be “relatively more important export suppliers.” While that 
is a possibility, it would be surprising in view of the common belief that large 
firms are responsible for a disproportionate share of exports in most countries. 
Another possibility  is that the plants at the low end of  the employment size 
scale are more often assembly-type operations with large imports of compo- 
nents and large exports of finished products, but small employment relative to 
their output. 
I do not mean to suggest that these interpretations are particularly  more 
convincing than those offered by the authors. My point is that results of com- 
parisons of size distributions are subject to a variety of equally plausible inter- 
pretations. 
The measures of turnover used in the analysis here are industry character- 
istics rather than variables to be affected by liberalization. Exits and entrances 
would be extremely interesting to observe and study as a consequence of lib- 
eralization rather than only as an industry characteristic. Who exits the indus- 
try? If they are small firms, are they inefficient small firms? Are new entrants 
small when they enter? It would also be interesting to study the relation  of 
exits and entrances  to the  size distribution of establishments.  A rise in the 
average output at the  10th percentile could reflect gains in output by all the 196  Mark J. Roberts and James R. ’Qbout 
firms in the lowest 10 percent. That seems to be the author’s usual interpreta- 
tion of the numbers. However, it could also reflect the disappearance of a large 
number of small firms, so that the ones now at the 10th percentile are the ones 
that were at the 20th percentile before. Those would be very different events, 
and it would be worth while to distinguish between them. Some of these is- 
sues are discussed elsewhere by Tyb~ut,~  but the results do not seem to get 
incorporated into the present discussion. 
Another section  of  the paper deals with  between-country  differences in 
what is referred to as productivity or labor productivity. The authors point out 
that this is a partial productivity  measure, but the point deserves emphasis. 
Since capital  intensity is not controlled  for, variations in labor productivity 
imply nothing about efficiency or about the marginal costs referred to earlier 
in the paper. It is conceivable that high labor productivity plants are simply 
capital-intensive operations, and there is no assurance that high capital inten- 
sity represents efficiency, particularly in a developing country. As the authors 
point out in commenting on the negative correlation  between export shares 
and labor productivity,  “trade liberalization should stimulate exports of labor- 
intensive products,” that is, by this measure, low productivity products. What 
can we conclude, then, from this analysis? 
Another aspect of liberalization that might be considered in future work is 
the degree of openness to foreign direct investment. Studies for Mexico seem 
to suggest that the presence of  foreign firms in an industry can have a substan- 
tial  effect  on  the  rate  of  growth  of  productivity  or  convergence  toward 
developed-country  productivity   level^.^  Foreign  direct  investment  does  not 
play the same role in manufacturing in Chile and Colombia as it does in Mex- 
ico, but the effect may be worth investigating,  especially if the census data 
distinguish foreign-owned establishments. 
On the whole, the results  presented  here  whet one’s appetite  for further 
study of these data. My feeling is that not much can be squeezed from further 
study of distributions of firms and that the most interesting results will come 
from the future work that will take advantage of the longitudinal aspect of the 
data. One would like to know  which firms and establishments  are growing 
and declining with trade liberalization or other changes in economic policy or 
external economic forces. The studies that have come from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s  program  of  analysis of  longitudinal  census data encourage me to 
believe that this project has potential payoffs that are not yet evident in this 
first report, and that is something to look forward to. 
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Comment  Peter A. Petri 
This is a novel and interesting paper, one of the few studies that I know that 
examine the effects of trade exposure using a firm-level, microeconomic data- 
set. It is also timely and important, given how much money and effort is cur- 
rently being  invested by  developing countries and the “terrible twins” (the 
IMF and  the World  Bank) in  outward-oriented development strategies. Fi- 
nally, it seems to produce a very surprising (though frankly not entirely con- 
vincing) result. 
Broadly, three types of static production gains can follow from trade liber- 
alization: intersectoral resource shifts from inefficient to efficient sectors, in- 
trasectoral resource shifts from inefficient to efficient firms, and intrafirm re- 
source shifts from inefficient to efficient activities. This paper addresses the 
middle tier of  these effects, the efficiency gains associated with changes in the 
market share of different firms. The authors use a theoretical model to asso- 
ciate efficiency with firm size, and they then check to see whether trade expo- 
sure leads to higher market shares for larger firms (i.e., greater concentra- 
tion). 
The surprise is that greater trade exposure tends to shift the size distribution 
toward smaller rather than larger firms. This runs against the predictions of 
the paper’s simple oligopoly model, which suggests that demand changes that 
represent greater openness should lead to a consolidation of industry output in 
the hands of larger, more efficient firms. There are two alternatives: The re- 
sults may be wrong, or the theory may be inappropriate. 
Consider first the strength of the evidence. The authors examine the effect 
of  trade exposure on industry structure by  running regressions of  firm size 
(the independent variable) on various measures of  trade exposure, both en- 
tered separately and in interaction with a “turnover” (ease-of-entry) variable. 
One factor that makes the results difficult to interpret is that the direct and 
interaction terms for a given trade exposure measure typically have opposite 
signs,  and  therefore the  net  effect of  trade exposure on  concentration is 
smaller than suggested by its direct coefficient alone. Fortunately, the authors 
do show net effects in table 6.3, which simulates changes in trade exposure 
holding other things constant. It shows that in low turnover industries (where 
the strongest effects are found), shifting from low to high trade exposure re- 
duces the median firm’s employment from 31.9 to 20.5 using the import pen- 
etration measure, from 27.3 to 26.5 using the export-output measure, but in- 
creases it from 41.1 to 43.4 using the ERP measure. No statistical brackets 
are given for these estimates, but it would seem that only the import penetra- 
tion results imply statistically significant changes. This raises the question, to 
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which  I return later,  whether something else might explain the relationship 
between high import exposure in particular and the absence of large firms. 
A second point concerns the nature of the dataset. The long-term analysis, 
which is the only one that appears to provide statistically  significant results, 
essentially compares industry size distributions in Colombia and Chile, rather 
than changes in the size distribution that might have resulted from a liberali- 
zation program.  Both Colombian and Chilean data exclude firms with fewer 
than  10 employees. Consider the implications of this floor in the following 
thought experiment.  Assume that before Chile liberalized  its trade,  firms in 
both Chile and Colombia were distributed uniformly between 10 and 100 em- 
ployees.  Suppose now  that  the  Pinochet  “treatment”  reduced  employment 
equally (say, by one half) in firms of every size category. We would therefore 
expect to see firms ranging from 5 to 50 employees in Chile-but  the Chilean 
census forces all firms below  10 employees to “exit”! Comparing the tops of 
the distributions across the two countries, we will see the full 50 percent de- 
cline, but at the bottom both Chile and Colombia have 10-employee firms (0 
percent decline). In between, the 25th percentile firm will appear to shrink by 
38 percent, and in general, the decline will appear smaller near the bottom of 
the distribution.  Since table 6.3 suggests that many firms are clustered near 
the  10-employee floor, one wonders to what extent the results are an artifact 
of censoring. 
Now  consider the appropriateness of  the theory. Were the large firms that 
may have disappeared in Chile more efficient than small firms? Unfortunately, 
there are apparently not enough data to examine the relationship between total 
factor productivity and firm size, and since factor proportions typically vary 
with firm size, labor productivity cannot serve as a proxy. Meanwhile, as the 
authors carefully note, the theoretical connection between size and efficiency 
is established only for the rather narrow specification of the paper-Cournot 
interactions in a homogeneous product oligopoly model. 
The authors propose several sensible alternative explanations based on the 
assumption that the products produced by different-sized firms are heteroge- 
neous-a  very plausible explanation in light of the great variability that we 
observe in various  firm statistics even within four-digit  industrial classifica- 
tions.  One possibility is that smaller firms are better able to survive foreign 
competition because they occupy niche markets, protected by natural barriers 
such as geography. This point nicely complements the analysis of U.S. steel 
markets elsewhere in this book; minimills have fared much better against im- 
ports than large integrated producers.  A further related possibility  is that the 
“missing” large firms in Chile are not missing because of greater import pen- 
etration, but because of third factors (say, the absence of some local raw ma- 
terial) that make the country uncompetitive in that product that the large firms 
would have made and that therefore also lead to higher import penetration. 
Finally, consider the implications of the paper for liberalization. Methodo- 
logical quibbles aside, there seems to be evidence here to support the paper’s 
central point, that it is futile to expect large gains from scale effects in import- 199  Size Rationalization and Trade Exposure 
besieged  industries.  But  should  we  be  looking  for  large  gains  from  trade 
within industries that are knocked out by foreign competition? The real gain 
here is that resources are released. There may still be plenty of rationalization 
elsewhere-across  firms classified  by a better correlate of  efficiency, within 
firms, and across sectors. The paper does not address these questions directly, 
but it presents intriguing evidence that such rationalization  is happening. The 
shrinkage of the manufacturing sector analyzed in the paper suggests that the 
action is elsewhere-perhaps  in grapes in Chile and other, more troublesome 
agricultural products in Colombia. I hope that in future work the authors will 
look deeply into these and other data to address the issue of efficiency. This is 
a stimulating beginning for an important, if difficult, journey. This Page Intentionally Left Blank